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How does Japanese aid influence the allocation of government expenditures and the raising of 
government revenues?   Using a non-linear model with an asymmetric loss function the case of 
Japanese aid to Indonesia is examined at the macroeconomic level.  It turns out that Japanese 
aid led to proportionately more development expenditures than other aid.   It also might have 
been positively related to an increased effort by the Indonesian government to raise taxes.     
Economic explanations based on a bounded rationality models are advanced.   Econometric 
and institutional explanations are also offered.   The three sets of explanations can be seen as 
overlapping and complementary. 
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  2 I.  Introduction 
 
    Japan's role in overseas development assistance is quite significant.   Most of the 
increase in Japanese aid came in late 80's.   As Table 1 shows, between 1975 and 1989, the 
amount of ODA increased eight-fold in dollar terms. 
 
    Much of Japanese aid has historically been directed to Asia.  As Yanagihara and 
Emig pointed out: 
 
 
  This feature reflects not only geographic proximity, but also 
close historical, cultural, and economic relations, as well as 
Tokyo's recognition of Asia as its logical sphere of 
responsibility in global burden-sharing.
1   
 
    Given the importance of Japanese aid overall, but especially in Asia, it is 
appropriate to undertake systematic econometric investigation of the impact of this aid.   In this 
paper I propose to do this for a single case by using time-series data.   By using continuous 
annual time-series data for Indonesia from 1970 to 1996(this covers the beginning of recovery 
during the new order regime and the period of fast growth and skips the crisis years beginning 
in 1997) it is possible to trace systematically within an economic model the impact of Japanese 
aid on development and non-development expenditures of the Indonesian government.   The 
model also brings out the response on the revenue side of the budget as well. 
 
                                                           




  3     As explained in section III, the government of Indonesia especially through the 
Development Plans (beginning with REPELITA I) has been active in promoting development.
2   
Thus it becomes important to explore the links, if any, between Japanese aid and development 
expenditures. 
 
    In addition to using a consistent time-series, the economic model itself may be of 
some interest to the reader.   I use a model of bounded rationality to describe the behavior of 
aid-recipients.   As Simon (1982) points out, policy-making in the real world inevitably 
encounters institutional bounds to rational behavior.   In such a context, policymakers may know 
their targets (e.g., development expenditures) only provisionally.   They may wish to minimize 
losses from such targets; but these targets almost certainly are not the ones that are the 
solutions of an optimizing exercise.   Thus in my model, the policymaker minimizes a loss 
function incorporating targets that reflect institutional limits to rational prediction. 
 
    Existing work on the impact of aid on the recipient countries is not conclusive.   
Heller (1975) and Khan and Hoshino (1992) did not find much difference between bilateral and 
multilateral sources of aid.   Pack and Pack (1990, 1993) found conflicting patterns of fungibility 
in the two cases they study.   One of them, Indonesia, actually seemed from their econometric 
work to be a country where, overall, aid was going to development.   However, they did not look 
at the effect of Japanese aid per se.   In fact, there is no available econometric study on the 
impact of Japanese foreign aid on Indonesia.   Thus, I hope to break some new ground by using 
a bounded rationality model and deriving econometric estimates from such a model.   Although 
                                                           
2  Although, since 1985, the regulative aspect of government has been loosened, its role in 
development (especially for infrastructure development) still remains very strong. See theassessment 




  4 not expected to be definitive, my results can throw some light on the behavior of Indonesian 
policymakers with respect to both Japanese and other foreign aid. 
 
 
II.  The Model 
 
    The following model is a variation of the model introduced by Gang and Khan 
(1989, 1994,1999) and Khan(1997).   The model describes how foreign aid influences the 
recipient's expenditure and revenue-raising behavior in a bounded-rationality setting.  In 
meeting preassigned values of indicator levels of expenditures and receipts the decision-makers 
respond in a predictable manner to any flows of aid from abroad. 
 
    It is important to use an explicitly asymmetric loss function because policy-
makers may weigh the overshooting and the undershooting of these indicator levels differently.  
For some policy-makers the under-achievement of some indicators may be more significant 
than overshooting.  For others the opposite may be the case. 
 
    Following Gang and Khan (1989, 1994,1999) I consider the decision-making 
process of boundedly rational policy-makers who consider ex ante in their budgetary planning 
certain indicators of the "proper" level of (planned) expenditures and revenues.  Although these 
levels are treated as targets ex ante the assumption of an asymmetric loss function implies that 
these are not the utility maximizing values.  In fact, the policy-makers possess a loss function in 




  5 The indicator levels from which such deviations are measured can be thought of as outcomes of 
bureaucratic negotiations within the state and between the recipient and the donors. 
 
    By this theoretical and modelling strategy it is possible to estimate the marginal 
impact of aid on budgetary expenditure and revenue categories.  Earlier works such as Heller 
(1975), Mosley, Hudson and Horrell (1989), Gang and Khan (1991), and Khan and Hoshino 
(1992) employed linear-quadratic or quadratic representations of the objective function.  In this 
paper I follow the recent work by Gang and Khan (1994) by using an objective function with 
higher degrees of both non-linearity and asymmetry. 
 
    The model takes into account the potential effect of aid on development and non-
development expenditures.  The former type of expenditures include the public sector's 
contribution to capital formation.  Human as well as non-human capital are included.  A third 
component of development expenditures is the government's contribution to social and 
economic services, e.g. expenditure on health and general welfare.  Non-development 
expenditures are the expenditures on state administration.  These two types of government 
expenditures are financed by internal and external means.  Domestic revenues include taxes, 
public enterprise surpluses and borrowing.  External assistance comes in the form of Japanese 
bilateral and other aid. 
 
    Much of the literature on the macroeconomic effects of foreign assistance 
focuses on aid's effect on economic growth.  Our modeling approach is to analyze the impact of 
aid on public sector variables.  Since aid funds pass through policy-maker's hand prior to 




  6 prerequisite to understanding the long-term effects of aid.  The distinction made here is between 
current development and current non-development expenditures.  As a rule the former will 
contribute to the long run health of the economy while the latter will not.
3 
 
    The policy-makers minimize a loss function subject to expenditure constraints.  In 
most general terms, the (quadratic-ratio) loss function, L, is given by 
 




  if j = *, then i
k = i, 
  if k = *, then i
j = i, 
  i = R, D, N, 
  β ≥ 2.   
        ( 1 )  
"j" and "k" are related in the following way: if j (respectively k) represents the indicator value 
(symbolized by *) then i
k (respectively, i
j) equals i.  "i" and "j" can be R, D, or N (domestic 
revenues, development expenditures and nondevelopment expenditure, respectively).  The 
simplest non-linear model which is also asymmetric and economically meaningful, is obtained 
when β = 2.  Note that for exact fulfillment of chosen indicator levels, L = α0 + (αR/2) + (αD/2) + 
(αN/2).  The policy-maker is making decisions on various categories of public expenditures.   
Each decision will reflect on her abilities, possibly her status, or even her job.  In an uncertain 
environment, the best she can do is to reach the stated chosen indicator value. 
                                                           
3  There can be some complementarity between development and nondevelopment expenditures.  For 
example, legal and other kinds of services and certain types of regulatory environment for "normal" 





  7     The loss function stated in equation (1) has the advantage of allowing for 
asymmetries in loss when the policy-maker over- or undershoots the chosen indicator level.  It 
also allows us to examine different assumptions about the "type" of the policy-maker.  For 
example, writing the loss function explicitly as  
 





illustrates a policy-maker who is "developmentalist" in orientation:  undershooting the 
development expenditure indicator value is worse than overshooting it.  At the same time, the 
above policy-maker is a "fiscal liberal" since overshooting the revenue raising indicator value is 
worse then undershooting.  Such policy-makers are not very anxious about the emergence of 
the inflationary gap.  These bureaucrats are also "non-statist" in that overshooting 
nondevelopment expenditures is worse than undershooting.  Statist bureaucrats who seek to 
maximize the resources which the state uses to reproduce itself would have loss functions that 
are asymmetric in exactly the opposite direction with regard to the composition of public 
expenditure.  All in all, there are eight possible characterizations.  These are summarized in 
Table 2.  Part of our problem is to explore which of these characterizations captures the 
behavior of policy-makers "best" in an empirical setting. 
 
    Given the type of policy-maker, the decision making problem can be described 
as the minimization of a specific form of equation (1).  The economic and institutional constraint 
to which this minimization problem is subjected is the following: 
 




  8 Table 1 


















































































































































  9 The above, of course, is the accounting identity that expenditures equal receipts.  To capture 
the distribution of foreign aid and domestic revenues into budgetary categories we instead write, 
 
  D = (1 - ρR)R + (1 - ρB)AB + (1 - ρM)AM,  (2)   
and, 
 N  =  ρRR + ρBAB + ρMAM.    (3) 
 
(1 - ρR), (1 - ρB), and (1 - ρM) are the fractions of domestically raised revenues, aid, Japanese 
bilateral aid and other aid, respectively, allocated to government development expenditures.  
There two constraints reflect alternative uses of government revenues augmented by foreign 
assistance.
4   The first constraint allows for the possibility that D can be financed partly by 
domestic revenues and partly by different sources of foreign aid.  The second constraint 
assumes that domestically raised revenues, and foreign aid not used for development purposes, 
go towards nondevelopment government expenditure.  The model thus involves a trade-off 
between development and other spending by the government.  It is a theoretical model of the 
implications of recipient preferences that can be used to determine the fiscal behavior of the 
government in the presence of foreign aid. 
 
  Solving the constrained loss minimization problem leads to a set of nonlinear 
simultaneous equations.  The direction and extent of the impact of Japanese bilateral and other 
                                                           
4  Incorporating fungibility into a decision making problem as a subproblem is extremely difficult.  Use of 
a single budgetary constraint a priori assumes that aid is 100 percent fungible.  While not directly 
addressing the fungibility issue, our approach does not a priori assume 100 percent fungibility; it does 
look at the allocation of aid among budgetary categories.  See Pack and Pack (1990, 1993) for further 




  10 foreign aid on N and D can be estimated.  The eight sets of estimating simultaneous systems 
equations appear in Table 2. 
 
III.   Data and Estimation Issues 
 
    The data set comprises of Japanese Foreign Aid to Indonesia from 1970-1996.   
This is the period when the New Order Government under Soeharto undertook successive 
development efforts in Indonesia.   In addition to the aid data the annual fiscal statistics on 
revenues and expenditures were also collected both from Indonesian and non-Indonesian 
sources.   Among Indonesian sources are the documents of BPS (the central bureau of 
statistics) and Bank of Indonesia (annual reports).   Indonesia Source Book from the National 
Development Information Office also served as a source of information.   After reconciling the 
statistics from various sources, all the data were converted to constant Rupiahs at 1980 
purchasing power parity prices. 
 
    For the purpose of estimating and interpreting the model correctly, it is important 
to remember that the policymakers work with actual budgetary data and not with theoretical 
entities we have in the model.   A translation between the two modes is necessary.   Fortunately 
for our purpose, however, the Indonesian budgetary categories do correspond to Development 
and Non-development expenditures to a large extent.   All the published categories such as 
Agriculture and Irrigation, Industry, Mining and Energy, Transportation, and Communications, 
Public Works and Transmigration, Education, Health and Family Planning can be used directly, 
Local and Regional Development and expenditures also occur as a separate category.   There 




  11 Table  2 
  Structural Equations 
Langrangian Estimating  equations 




2 - λD(D - (1 - ρR)R - (1 - ρB)AB - (1 - ρM)AM) -   
λN(N - ρRR - ρBAB - ρMAM) 
D = (1 - ρR)R + (1 - ρB)AB + (1 - ρM)AM  









2 - λD(D - (1 - ρR)R - (1 - ρB)AB - (1 - ρ3)AM) -   
λN(N - ρRR - ρBAB - ρMAM) 
D = (1 - ρR)R + (1 - ρB)AB + (1 - ρM)AM  










2 - λD(D - (1 - ρR)R - (1 - ρB)AB - (1 - ρM)AM) -   
λN(N - ρRR - ρBAB - ρMAM) 
D = (1 - ρR)R + (1 - ρB)AB + (1 - ρM)AM  










2 - λD(D - (1 - ρR)R - (1 - ρB)AB - (1 - ρM)AM) -   
λN(N - ρRR - ρ2AB - ρMAM) 
D = (1 - ρR)R + (1 - ρB)AB + (1 - ρM)AM  











2 - λD(D - (1 - ρR)R - (1 - ρB)AB - (1 - ρM)AM) -   
λN(N - ρRR - ρBAB - ρMAM) 
D = (1 - ρR)R + (1 - ρB)AB + (1 - ρM)AM  










2 - λD(D - (1 - ρR)R - (1 - ρB)AB - (1 - ρM)AM) -   
λN(N - ρRR - ρBAB - ρMAM) 
D = (1 - ρR)R + (1 -ρB)AB + (1 - ρM)AM  











2 - λD(D - (1 - ρ)R - (1 - ρB)AB - (1 - ρM)AM) -   
λN(N - ρRR - ρBAB - ρMAM) 
D = (1 - ρR)R + (1 - ρB)AB + (1 - ρM)AM  











2 - λD(D - (1 - ρR)R - (1 - ρB)AB - (1 - ρM)AM) -   
λN(N - ρRR - ρBAB - ρMAM) 
D = (1 - ρR)R + (1 - ρB)AB + (1 - ρ￿M)AM  












  12 officials, it was decided that part of this "catch-all" category, in fact, caught some "non-
development expenditures."   It was estimated to be between 25% and 40%.   After further 
discussions and checking (a very time-consuming process) with the Ministry of Finance and 
BPS officials an estimate of linkage to non-development expenditures was arrived at for each 
year between 1970 and 1996. 
 
    On the revenue side Development Funds including Project Aid are clearly 
marked off from the other items.   The flow from income, value added tax, excise and import tax 
receipts constitute the major sources of government tax revenues.   The tax-collection system 
was standardized and modernized as a result of the post-1983 reform program.   Corporate and 
personal income taxes are now set at the top marginal rate of 35 percent on annual incomes 
above Rp. 50 millions.   Tax revenues have risen in recent years.   However, a large part of 
revenues has traditionally come from the oil and gas sectors.   In 1987 Indonesia was the lowest 
taxed nation in Southeast Asia with a tax to GDP ratio of 9.1 percent.   By 1990 the ratio rose to 
12.5 percent. 
 
    The econometric estimation procedure for the models in Table 3 follows a 
system-wide approach.   The simultaneous non-linear 3 stage SURE (seemingly unrelated 
regression estimation procedure) method is used.   The econometric package used is SHAZAM.   
The estimation procedure also includes correction for autocorrelation in simultaneous equations 
framework. 
 
    As mentioned in the previous section the "boundedly rational" nature of the 




  13 only roughly accurate.  Since there is very little empirical evidence of Indonesian policy-makers' 
actual chosen indicator levels for these targets it becomes an important problem to estimate 
these.  The planning documents are not adequate since they are drawn up at infrequent 
intervals and represent longer term targets.  The categorizations are also different from those 
required by the approach adopted here.  Therefore I try to approximate the chosen indicator 
levels by regressing the actual ex post values on a series of instrumental variables and then 
forecasting the indicator values.  As Sargent has recently pointed out in the context of rational 
expectations, the economist or the econometrician actually works in a bounded rationality sense 
when predicting values such as these from models such as the ones I have used.
5 
 
    Each indicator level is estimated by specifying an equation relating the actual 
variable to some instruments.  I then regress the actual variable on the chosen instruments (with 
correction for auto-correlation).  Planned D is obtained by estimating an equation where D is a 
linear function of GDP and total gross domestic investment in the private sector together with 
proxies for investment in human capital.  The fitted values of the dependent variable serve as 
indicator levels.  Planned R is found in a similar manner, by regressing R on GDP and lagged 
imports and then using the fitted values of the dependent variable as the indicator value.   
Planned N is obtained by regressing N on the lagged value of itself. 
                                                           





  14 IV.   Results and Interpretation 
 
    How has Japanese aid influenced the fiscal behavior of the Indonesian policy 
makers?   In order to answer this question, it is important to understand how the allocation 
between budgetary categories can be influenced by the injection of foreign aid. 
 
    According to the theoretical approach adopted here the policy-makers respond to 
the availability of foreign aid by reallocating money to the various budgetary categories.   
Although the model assumes bounded rationality, the reallocation itself is in response to 
additional amounts of foreign aid and is therefore in keeping with allocation at the margin.   Thus 
comparative statistics exercises can be performed legitimately.   My major concern here is to 
examine the allocation of finance to development and non-development expenditures.  An 
additional area of interest is the impact of aid on domestic revenue raising. 
 
    The results of the empirical exercise for Indonesia are given in Table 3.  The 
structural equations in Table 2 contain parameters ρR, ρB and ρM by way of constraints (2) and 
(3).  These three parameters show the nondevelopment expenditure responses to an increase 
in domestic revenues, bilateral Japanese aid, and other multilateral and non-Japanese bilateral 
aid respectively.  In the table estimates for these three parameters together with some others 
are shown for the eight different models describing eight different policy maker types as 
described in Table 1.  For the structural equations I refer the reader to Table 2.  After some 
general observations, I have chosen to discuss two cases in detail for illustrative purposes.  





  15 Table 3 
 
The Impact of Japanese and Non-Japanese Aid 
to Indonesia 1960-1996 
Non-linear SURE Parameter Estimates 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
MODEL  ρM  ρB  ρR  αD/αR  αN/αR  AIC 
Type 












































































































  16     Looking across the rows in Table 3, it is striking that for both developmentalist 
and non-developmentalist types of policymakers Japanese bilateral aid seems to have had a 
greater impact than the rest of the world aid in almost every case on development expenditures.   
It may be recalled from Table 2 that Types I-IV are the non-developmental policymakers and 
Types V-VIII are the developmental ones.   It is also interesting to see the difference between 
the two types.   The co-efficients (with varying degrees of significance) ρB vary between .6123 
and .7393 for models I-IV.   That means that in the presence of Japanese aid approximately 26 
to 39 percent of this aid goes to development expenditure on the margin if the policymaker is 
non-developmental.   On the other hand, from models V-VIII, the corresponding percentage of 
aid going to development expenditures is between 67 and 53 percent.   For models I to IV, ρM 
varies between .7241 and .8228.   For models V to VIII, the range is between .4772 and .6568. 
Thus in terms of influencing development expenditures in Indonesia Rupiah for Rupiah 
Japanese bilateral aid has been more successful than the non-Japanese aid.   In addition to 
revealing the influence of Japanese aid, the above co-efficients also indicate that the type of the 
policymaker really can make a difference.   This is also true in terms of financing development 
expenditures out of domestic revenue.   For a non-developmental policymaker ρR varies 
between .7215 and .8226.   Rather dismally, this implies that between 72 and 82 percent of 
domestic revenues may go to non-development expenditures in the presence of aid. 
 
    What kind of policymakers did make the decisions in Indonesia regarding 
development?   This is a particularly fascinating question, but is hard to answer in a definitive 
fashion.   The "best guess" one can make must use a great deal of reliable institutional history.   
In case of Indonesia this is largely unavailable.  The books and articles written on this subject 




  17 commitment to genuine development objective emerges.   This is also consistent with my own 
visits to Indonesia and extensive investigations with the Indonesian and non-Indonesian 
academics and development practitioners on the subject. 
  
    I am also able to offer some econometric evidence to corroborate the above 
characterization.   In Table 4, the last column presents the value of the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC) for each of the eight models.   AIC is a model selection criterion that can be 
applied to any model that can be estimated by the maximum likelihood method.  One simply 
minimizes (2LogL)/n + 2k/n where k=the number of parameters in the likelihood function L and n 
is the number of observations.   Particularly for a non-linear model the AIC is a convenient 
econometric discriminator among different model specifications.  It would seem that by this 
criterion at least type VII policy-maker model may be the most appropriate one for Indonesia 
during the period of observation.  This means that both developmental and statist concerns 
dominated the real fiscal agenda during this period.  This too, seems to be consistent with the 
institutional studies and my own informed observations. 
 
    Let us consider then the type VII policy maker first.  According to the typology in 
table 2 this is further a fiscally liberal policy maker.  All the ρ's are positive and significant at .05 
level.
6   In the presence of foreign aid almost 50% of the additional revenue goes to non-
development expenditures.  For bilateral Japanese foreign aid the percentage going to 
development expenditures is 67% whereas 54% of aid from all other sources is spent for non-
developmental purposes.  Thus, a straightforward interpretation would have been to claim the 
                                                           
6  From here on wherever the phrase "statistically significant" occurs it will mean significant at .05 level 




  18 superiority of Japanese aid over other aid in this case.  However, some caution is required.  We 
do not know if the presence of aid pulls some money out of the domestic revenue to non-
development purposes.  It is reasonable to suspect that for some categories of aid (for both 
generally Japanese and other aid) this may be partially the case.  Under these circumstances if 
the substitution effect is not too high (i.e. aid doesn't replace completely development 
expenditures that would have been financed out of domestic revenues) only then there is an 
incremental effect of aid on development expenditures.  Under this scenario, Japanese bilateral 
aid would seem to be more effective Rupiah for Rupiah  than other aid.   I show next that in 
case of Indonesia this may be a reasonable conclusion. 
 
    The ratios of the parameters from the loss function (the α's) can be readily 
interpreted by referring to the structural equations.  In the simultaneous equations framework, 
given the specific objective function and constraints, the ratios of α's (e.g. αD/αR or αN/αR) 
indicate how to explain the changes in domestic revenue in the presence of foreign aid.  For the 
type VII policy-maker both αD/αR and αN/αR are significantly different from zero.  The 
interpretation of the first of these coefficients is as follows:  in the presence of foreign aid any 
increase in development expenditures reduces the domestic revenue raising effort.  The 
quantitative magnitude is given in a non-linear fashion by the product of this coefficient and (1-
ρR).  However raising the target for development expenditures even with aid coming in will lead 
to an increase in R.   The coefficient αN/αR also gives an estimate of (partial) impact of non-
development expenditures on R.  In this case an increase in non-development expenditures 
also leads to an increase in R.  Also this magnitude is further increased by the magnitude of R*.  
Thus, bureaucratic or political decision to increase R* will lead to an increase in revenues as 




  19     If aid-dependent revenue effect is positive, then the presence of aid actually 
increases domestic revenue.  In the case of Indonesia for model VII type of policymaker this will 
be true.  Let us now turn to the model which has the least AIC value among the rest; this is 
model VI.   As can be seen from Table 2 this is the developmental, non-statist and fiscally 
conservative type.   
  
    Looking across the row under the headings for the various parameters the 
contrast is indeed quite reassuring empirically.  More than 52% of the domestic revenue goes 
towards development expenditures even in the presence of foreign aid.  The coefficient is 
significant both statistically and economically.  Out of bilateral Japanese aid, again in a 
statistically significant sense, about 61% goes to development expenditures.  Of the other aid 
receipts about 55% goes to development expenditures.  Thus, a major hypothesis of this study 
is verified:  the more developmental the orientation of the policy-maker the more foreign aid 
influences spending in the direction of development.   It also corroborates the earlier finding that 
bilateral Japanese aid performed well in general. 
 
    Turning now to the other coefficients αD/R and αN/R have absolute values of .0213 
and .0235 and both are statistically significant.  Looking at the revenue equation for this type of 
policy maker in Table 3 we can see that the negativity of αD/αR (estimated) implies that revenue 
increases as indicator levels of development expenditures increase although the rate of 
increase is quite slow.  This is consistent with a developmentalist but fiscally conservative 
preference.  Aid finances development expenditures more than domestic revenue raising 
efforts.  In the absence of aid such expenditures may drop dramatically.  Non-development 




  20 budget fiscal conservatism.  It also suggests that foreign aid is only marginally diverted to non-
development expenditures when finance is needed.  It is more likely that domestic revenues are 
increased more than proportionately to cover these non-development expenditures. 
 
    From the discussion of the two cases, it would seem that developmental, statist 
Indonesian policymaking environment contributed to the salutary effects of Japanese aid.     
Whether the policymakers were fiscally conservative or liberal may not have made that much 
difference although the budget deficits point towards the latter type.   If we go by the evidence of 
budget deficits model VII would indeed seem to be the right model and my earlier observations 
would be strengthened. 
  
    These results are very much at variance with the received wisdom on the effect 
of foreign aid on public expenditures.   Japanese aid may be more effective because of the links 
with infrastructure investment.   It may also be the case that the microlevel projects are more 
successfully managed through technical cooperation.   There is some evidence for this 
(Khan,1997). 
 
    These results also confirm Howard Pack and Janet Pack's findings with regards 
to fungibility of aid in Indonesia (Pack and Pack, 1990).   Their study did not separate out 
Japanese aid which this paper does.   But they find "that in the largest categories aid is spent for 
which it is given."   They also find as in some of the models discussed above that taxes are 
raised in the presence of aid.   In the present study, the econometric reasons for this are given 
by the signs and parameter estimates.   However, the institutional explanation is more obscure.   




  21 also be the case that some aid flow requires matching funds (Cashel-Cordo and Craig, 1986; 
Booth, 1988). 
 
V.  Conclusions  
 
    Contrary to the anti-aid literature Japanese aid to Indonesia seems to have had 
considerable effect on development expenditures in the public sector in Indonesia.   Japanese 
aid also performed better than other aid regardless of the type of policymakers in Indonesia.   It 
may also be accompanied by an increase in revenue raising efforts on the part of Indonesia. 
 
    That Japanese aid is more effective than other aid is surprising but not 
completely counter-intuitive in the Asian context.   Japan's field experience, technical 
cooperation and mainly infrastructure-oriented aid can go a long distance toward an adequate 
explanation (Khan, 1995; Browne, 1990).   Of course, as Japanese aid becomes more 
diversified, the situation may change. 
 
    In addition to exploring the effect of Japanese aid systematically, this study is 
also able to confirm the Packs' findings with regards to Indonesia.   It is rare in economics to use 
different models and somewhat different data and find similar types of answers.   Thus aid-
development expenditures relation in case of Indonesia seem to be robust.   If this is indeed the 
case, then the results with regards to the effects of Japanese aid would seem to be credible. 
 
    Further work disaggregating both the types of Japanese aid and the categories of 




  22 results from one or two countries can not be generalized readily without falling a ready prey to 
the fallacy of induction.   Careful work covering more countries will reveal in the future just how 
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